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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Income Tax-BUSINESS PURPOSE REQUIRED FOR RECOGNITION OF
ORDINARY LOSSES-DOMINANT MOTIVATION TEST FOR BUSINESS BAD
DEBTS SHOULD BE APPLIED TO SALES OF STOCK
Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. Cl. 1971)
United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972)
Corporate stock is normally considered a capital asset, the sale of
which gives rise to the recognition of either capital gain or loss.' Since
the promulgation of the Corn Products doctrine by the Supreme
Court in 1955,2 however, taxpayers have been able to deduct losses on
I The Internal Revenue Code defines capital asset as follows:
Mhe term "capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer (whether
or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include-
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which
would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at
the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject
to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property
used in his trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, or similar
property, held by-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is deter-
mined, for the purpose of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in
whole or in part by reference to the basis of such property in the hands
of the person whose personal efforts created such property;
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade
or business for services rendered or from the sale of property described in
paragraph (1); or
(5) an obligation of the United States or any of its possessions, or of a
State or Territory, or any political subdivision thereof, or of the District of
Columbia, issued on or after March 1, 1941, on a discount basis and payable
without interest at a fixed maturity date not exceeding one year from the
date of issue.
INT. R. v. CODE OF 1954, § 1221 [hereinafter cited as CODE]. Corporate stock does not come
under any of the listed exceptions and is considered to be a capital asset except in the
hands of a dealer who sells to customers. Id. § 1221(1); see Note, Judicial Treatment of
"Capital" Assets Acquired for Business: The New Criterion, 65 YALuE L.J. 401, 406 n.28
(1956).
It is to the taxpayer's advantage to have gains treated as capital and losses treated
as non-capital (ordinary). In computing his taxable income, the taxpayer may exclude
one half of the excess of his net long term capital gains over his net short term capital
losses (CODE § 1202); under some circumstances even more favorable treatment may be
obtained. Id. § 1201. See id. § 1222 for definitions of net long term capital gain and net
short term capital loss. Capital losses, on the other hand, may not be deducted from gross
income except to offset capital gains or, in the case of an individual with no capital gains,
to the extent of $1,000 per year. Id. § 1211.
2 Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). The case involved the
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sales of stock in full, without regard to the capital loss provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, if the stock was purchased and held in con-
nection with the taxpayer's trade or business.3 As might be expected,
taxpayers who have sustained losses on the sale of stock have at-
tempted to take full advantage of the Corn Products doctrine and have
sought to fit their transactions within the parameters of the doctrine
whenever any connection existed between the stock and the taxpayer's
trade or business.4 Certain recent cases have suggested the possibility
purchase of corn futures by a taxpayer in the business of manufacturing starch, syrup,
sugar, and various other products from corn. Droughts in alternate years caused steep
increases in the price of corn purchased for immediate delivery (spot corn), and the tax-
payer became unable to purchase corn at a price which would have enabled it to sell
its products at prices competitive with those of non-corn substitutes. To protect itself
against these high prices and the accompanying possibility of operating losses, the tax-
payer instituted a policy of buying corn futures at a favorable price. If the price of spot
corn was low and no shortage was imminent, the futures were sold; if unfavorable condi-
tions existed in the spot market, the futures were exercised. The taxpayer realized overall
gain on these transactions and attempted to treat the gains as capital gains, since com-
modity futures, like corporate stock, are normally capital assets. The Supreme Court
upheld the determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the gains were
ordinary income, reasoning that the futures dealing was "vitally important to the
company's business as a form of insurance against increases in the price of raw corn." Id.
at 50. The Court determined that the futures transactions were part of the taxpayer's
everyday business and, as such, were intended by Congress to give rise to ordinary rather
than capital gain or loss. Id. at 52.
3 It should be noted that the Corn Products rule, although decided in the context of
a gain, has in its application to the stock purchase situation exclusively involved losses
rather than gains. See note 17 infra. Shortly before the Supreme Court's decision in
Corn Products, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that ordinary asset
treatment was similarly appropriate for losses realized on the sale of securities purchased
as a business necessity. Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1944).
There the taxpayer was required to post United States government bonds as security for
a contract. When the security was no longer needed, the bonds were sold at a loss. Com-
paring the loss on the bonds to the cost of a surety bond, which would have been fully
deductible, the court allowed full deduction of the loss. Id. at 946. Together with Corn
Products, Bagley & Sewall forms the basis for the so-called "Corn Products doctrine."
Technically, there is language in Corn Products which would imply that the Corn
Products Refining Co., through its transactions, had become a dealer in corn futures.
As a dealer, the company would have been entitled to ordinary loss treatment by virtue of
CODE § 1221(1), which provides: "Mhe term 'capital asset' . . . does not include--()
... property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
his trade or business .... Nevertheless, the Corn Products and Bagley & Sewall decisions
have consistently been interpreted as holding that courts are not bound by the exceptions
specified in § 1221 in defining non-capital assets, but may additionally exclude certain
property. See, e.g., Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1958);
Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 845 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 869 (1970). See also Kauffman, A Second Look at the Corn Products Doctrine, 41
TAxEs 605, 609 (1963).
4 E.g., John J. Grier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964) (purchase of
stock in restaurant by restaurant chain owner which enabled chain to acquire lease on
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of a dual purpose on the part of the taxpayer when the stock is pur-
chased 5-where, although there may be a legitimate business-related
purpose for acquiring the stock, there is also an evident nonbusiness
purpose, which, were it the sole motivation for the acquisition, would
require treatment of the stock as a capital asset.
Until recently, courts have tended to disregard this possibility,
preferring instead to force the fact situation to fit into rigid categories
of either business or nonbusiness motivation.6 Aside from the dis-
ground under new restaurant); Hagan v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Ark. 1968)
(purchase of stock for purpose of obtaining exclusive right to sell poultry feed to issu-
ing corporation); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 803 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (pur-
chase of stock of paper mill by newspaper publisher to assure itself a supply of newsprint);
Ancel Greene & Co., 88 T.C. 125 (1962) (purchase of stock of Federal National Mortgage
Association as necessary prerequisite of mortgage sale to the association); Missisquoi Corp.,
87 T.C. 791 (1962) (purchase of debentures of paper mill by paperboard manufacturer to
assure itself a supply of raw materials); Electrical Fittings Corp., 33 T.C. 1026 (1960) (pur-
chase of foundry stock by electrical parts manufacturer to assure itself a supply of needed
castings); Gulftex Drug Co., 29 T.C. 118 (1957) (purchase of distilling company stock by
liquor distributor to obtain supply of liquor).
5 Eg., Dearborn Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. Cl. 1971); see Steadman v.
Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); Waterman, Lar-
gen & Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 845 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); notes
12-14 and accompanying text infra.
6 See Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869
(1970); Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 845 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied,
400 US. 869 (1970). In Waterman, the taxpayer, a dealer in yarn, purchased $100,000
worth of stock in a wool milling corporation for which the taxpayer then sold
wool on commission in connection with the reorganization of the milling corpora-
tion. The stock was purchased to enable the taxpayer to become the exclusive sales
agent for the milling corporation, whose board chairman was of the opinion that the
mill's exclusive sales agent should have a substantial investment interest in the mill. 419
F2d at 849-50. The taxpayer considered the exclusive agency essential to the continuation
of its business, but expected the agency to increase significantly its revenues from the sale
of worsted wool yarn. The taxpayer became the exclusive sales agent for the mill, but
sales were lower than expected, and, after about two years, the milling corporation
terminated the agency. The taxpayer immediately sold its stock and suffered a $75,000
loss, which it deducted in full. The majority of the court found this deduction justified
owing to the business, rather than investment, motivation of the transaction. Id. at 854-
55. A dissenting judge questioned this finding, citing the expected sales increase and the
desire of the mill's board chairman that its exclusive agent be an investor as evidence of
a dual motivation. Id. at 861 (dissenting opinion).
The taxpayer in Steadman, a lawyer, was retained as general counsel of a corporation
formed by one Richards. Additional capital became necessary approximately one year
after formation of the corporation. One of the corporation's creditors offered to purchase
stock with the understanding that the creditor would take control of the corporation.
The creditor made it clear that once in control it would have the corporation's legal
work handled by the creditor's law firm rather than by the taxpayer. In order to keep
Richards in control of the corporation and thus assure the retention of his own position,
the taxpayer arranged for the purchase of 70,000 shares of newly issued stock, keeping
32,000 for himself at a cost of $80,000. Prior to this time, the taxpayer had acquired
12,000 shares. The additional capital failed to solve the corporation's financial difficulties.
[Vol. 58:166
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
tortions which result, continued avoidance of the problem will lead to
unpredictability in the application of the law. Each court will apply a
formula to each fact pattern in order to decide which category is more
appropriate, while refusing to recognize any dual purpose which might
exist. The courts in future cases will be offered no real basis for the ap-
plication of precedents and the end result will be a mere catalogue of
individual fact patterns and their resolutions. This rigidity will merely
add to the confusion and promote forum shopping7 A uniform stan-
dard, on the other hand, would permit explicit consideration of all the
facts and give reviewing courts the opportunity to approve or disap.
prove the test used, thus encouraging consistency among the various
tribunals.8
THE Dearborn APPROACH
In Dearborn Co. v. United States,9 the Court of Claims attempted
to analyze the problems raised by the presence of a dual purpose. Dur-
About three years later the corporation filed a petition under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act, and the taxpayer's shares became worthless. Both the Tax Court and the
Sixth Circuit allowed full deduction of the loss suffered on the 32,000 shares purchased
to keep Richards in control, finding a purely business motivation for the purchase.
Charles W. Steadman, 50 T.C. 369 (1968), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
869 (1970). Again one judge at the trial level dissented, doubting that the evidence justified
a finding that Steadman possessed no investment motivation with respect to the &2,000
shares. 50 T.C. at 383-84 (dissenting opinion).
Both cases illustrate the problems and distortions which necessarily follow from a
strictly categorical approach. Although the decisions seem intuitively correct, the facts
of the cases strongly imply at least some investment purpose motivating the purchases. A
standard which recognizes this combination of purposes would enable the courts to reach
their ultimate determination in a more realistic manner.
7 In the event of a deficiency determination on any federal income tax return, the
taxpayer may contest the decision within 90 days upon petition to the Tax Court (CoD
§ 6213(a)), or he may pay the tax and subsequently sue for a refund in either the Court
of Claims (jurisdiction granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970)) or in the appropriate federal
district court (jurisdiction granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1970)). Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1970), the district courts are given this original jurisdiction con-
currently with the Court of Claims over "[a]ny civil action against the United States for
the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected." The adoption of differing standards or tests among the courts
would allow the informed taxpayer a significantly greater chance of recovery by a calcu-
lated choice of forum.
8 The analogous problem with bad debts provides an appropriate example. Once
the courts announce the tests being used, a reviewing court can determine the proper test
and establish a rule for the future. Such was the rationale in United States v. Generes,
405 U.S. 93 (1972), in which the Supreme Court decided that the test for the business or
nonbusiness nature of a bad debt loss should be dominant rather than merely significant
motivation. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text infra.
9 444 F.2d 1145 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
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ing a period when hardwood was in short supply, the taxpayer, a furni-
ture manufacturer, purchased stock in the Munising Wood Products
Company which produced, among other things, hardwood and furni-
ture parts which the taxpayer needed to carry on its business. The stock
purchases enabled the taxpayer to gain management control of Munis-
ing and assure itself an adequate supply of these raw materials.
Munising produced other products as well, and by continuing to run
the woodworking company as a separate entity, Dearborn was able
to receive both dividends and management fees from its operations.10
About eleven years after the first purchases, the Munising stock was
sold at a loss of $151,000, which the taxpayer attempted to deduct in full
under the Corn Products doctrine, claiming that the purpose for the
purchase had been to assure itself a supply of scarce raw materials
needed in its business."
The court found that Dearborn's primary reason for purchasing
the Munising stock had indeed been to assure itself a ready supply
of materials needed for the continuation of Dearborn's furniture busi-
ness.12 The court also found the expectation of receiving dividends and
management fees to have been significant, thereby concluding that
Dearborn had additionally been motivated by "substantial investment
purpose and intent."'18 Without citing any prior authority, the court
found that the "decided law in this area" precluded full deduction-
ordinary loss treatment-where a substantial, although not primary,
nonbusiness purpose was present.14 Accordingly, the taxpayer's claim
was not allowed.
'0 Id. at 1166.
11 Id. at 1147-48. This was the typical "business purpose" rationale used to justify
full deduction in earlier cases. See, e.g., Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F.
Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1958); Electrical Fittings Corp., 35 T.C. 1026 (1960).
12 444 F.2d at 1166.
13 Id. at 1168; see id. at 1166-68.
14 The court apparently based its decision on the following language from Booth
Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 921 (Ct. Cl. 1962), quoted in 444 F-,d at
1147:
L1]f securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and necessary act in the
conduct of his business, and continue to be so held until the time of their sale,
any loss incurred as a result thereof may be fully deducted from gross income
as a business expense or ordinary loss. If, on the other hand, an investment pur-
pose be found to have motivated the purchase or holding of the securities, any
loss realized upon their ultimate disposition must be treated in accord with the
capital asset provisions of the Code.
Although this language would seem to support the Dearborn court's decision, an exami-
nation of the Booth Newspapers opinion reveals that there, as in other cases (see note 6
supra), the court assumed the taxpayers could have only one motivation for purchasing
stock. The facts of the two cases were similar. In Booth Newspaper it was shown
that the taxpayers had purchased the stock of a paper mill in order to assure themselves
[Vol. 58:166
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By expressly considering the possibility that both business and non-
business factors may motivate a stock purchase, the Dearborn court
took a significant step toward resolving the dual purpose dichotomy.
To comply with the rule of Corn Products, the test adopted should per-
mit the full deduction if the stock is purchased "as an integral and
necessary act in the conduct of [taxpayer's] business."' 5 Any test chosen
should also deny the taxpayer the option of treating the stock as ordi-
nary or capital property depending on whether its sale produces gain or
loss. To allow such an election would permit a taxpayer able to relate
his investments to a business purpose to place part of the risk of those
investments on the public. Since this result is contrary to the intent of
the law,16 such an election should be discouraged insofar as is possible.'7
a supply of newsprint needed in their newspaper publishing business. The mill had pre-
viously been in the business of producing other paper products, however, and the tax-
payers continued this business to the extent consistent with utilizing the mill as a source
of supply for newsprint. Arguably, the taxpayers' eventual goal was to sell the mill at an
attractive price. The court did not consider the possibility that this constituted an in-
vestment motivation for the acquisition, stating, "The difficulty with [the government's]
position is simply that the record will not support a conclusion that [the taxpayers] were
investment-minded when they purchased the stock." 303 F.2d at 921.
15 Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916, 921 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
16 It may be argued that the law does not intend to prohibit this practice. CODE
§ 1231 permits deduction in full of losses incurred in the sale of real and depreciable per-
sonal property used in a trade or business, while allowing recognition of capital gains
if such property is sold at a gain. The property covered by this section, however, does
not include corporate stock, and Congress failed to include provision for such stock in
an extensive revision of § 1231 included in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (Pub. L. No.
91-172, 83 Stat. 487). Thus, the rule of the courts-that the transaction will be treated as
ordinary or capital depending on its purpose, without regard to whether gain or loss was
realized-remains in force.
17 This Note deals only with the legal aspect of the business-related stock purchase
problem, that is, the selection of an appropriate test to determine whether a transaction
is sufficiently business related to require treatment of the stock as ordinary property.
Even with the adoption of a uniform standard, however, the taxpayer may retain, to a cer-
tain degree, the choice of treating the stock as ordinary or capital property according to
whether a gain or loss is realized upon its sale. Where a loss is realized, the standard may be
applied and ordinary or capital loss recognized, depending upon the circumstances of the
case. Ordinarily, however, a gain on the sale of stock will be capital gain and it is there-
fore doubtful whether, in most cases, the Internal Revenue examiner will question a
return on which capital gain treatment of stock gains has been claimed. Although Corn
Products itself involved a contention by the government that the sale of corn futures
produced ordinary rather than capital gain, this case may have attracted special atten-
tion in the Internal Revenue Service because of its unusual fact situation. In the early
years of its trading in corn futures, the Corn Products Refining Co. realized losses, which
were deducted in full. In later years, when gains exceeded previous losses, the tax-
payer attempted to amend its earlier returns to have all transactions taxed as sales of
capital assets. See 350 US. at 49.
As might be expected, all of the reported cases subsequent to Corn Products dealing
with corporate stock have involved losses, since absent special facts like those of Corn
1972]
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Although the "substantial nonbusiness purpose" test of Dearborn
represents a step forward from prior decisions, Dearborn is still too
restrictive in that it does not permit full deduction in all cases in which
the stock purchase is a necessary business act. A stock purchase may be
a business necessity yet concomitantly offer a significant investment
opportunity. 8 Application of the Dearborn test in such a case would
either conffict with the rationale of Corn Products or require the courts
to distort the facts to reach the correct result. A proper standard should
deal with this dual purpose in a more realistic fashion.19
II
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
A situation analogous to the stock purchase problem may arise
under section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code. This section allows a
taxpayer to deduct the amount of any unsecured debt20 which becomes
worthless during the tax year. Subsection (d) of this section, however,
limits the noncorporate taxpayer's treatment of bad debt losses to
the amount specified for short term capital losses2l unless the debt was
"created or acquired in connection with" or "the loss from the worth-
lessness of which is incurred in" the taxpayer's trade or business.22 Since
Products capital gain claims will not ordinarily be questioned. But cf. Hollywood Baseball
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970), where
the government was upheld in requiring a minor league baseball dub to treat the
gains from sales of its player contracts-essentially the "raw materials" of the business-
as ordinary income on the ground that such contracts were held for sale on demand. This
administrative problem has been recognized and statutory and regulatory solutions have
been suggested. See Kauffman, supra note 3, at 613; Note, supra note 1, at 408-12.
Neither Congress nor the Treasury has adopted such a solution, however, and the courts'
power is limited to deciding the cases before them. Accordingly, the administrative prob-
lem is likely to remain. The discussion herein is consequently focused on the allowance
of the ordinary deduction upon realization of a loss only.
18 See, e.g., Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United States, 419 V.2d 845 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970). Although the court in Waterman found the stock purchase
necessary to the taxpayer's business and thus the loss upon sale fully deductible (419 F.2d
at 854-55), the mill's owner insisted that its exclusive agent have a "substantial financial
interest" in the mill. Id. at 849. Additionally, the mill was reopening at a new location
and its owners expected to operate the business at a profit. Id. at 857 (dissenting opinion).
The possibility of at least some investment motive was strongly implied. See id. at 861
(dissenting opinion).
19 See text accompanying notes 6-8 sura.
20 Unsecured debt and debt as used herein refer to a debt which is not evidenced by
a bond, note, debenture, certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness. Cf. CoDE
§§ 165(g)(2)(C), 166 (e).
21 For treatment of short term capital losses, see id. §§ 1211-12.
22 Id. § 166(d)(2).
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the statute speaks only of "trade or business" and not of profit-making
activities in general,23 the same business-investment question involved
in business-related stock purchase cases is present in those cases in
which a shareholder-employee of a corporation makes a loan to his
employer which later becomes worthless.24 It has been held that serving
an employer constitutes the "business" of an employee for the pur-
poses of section 166;25 hence, if the debt were created or acquired or
became worthless "in connection with" the employment relationship, the
debt upon default would be fully deductible as a business bad debt.ns
If the debt merely were related to the shareholder relation, however,
only a short term capital loss could be recognized.27
Considerably more attention has been given by the courts to the
taxpayer's possible dual purpose in the shareholder-employee bad debt
situation than in the stock purchase situation. This may be due in part
to the requirement contained in the regulations under section 166
that the debt bear a "proximate relationship" to the taxpayer's trade
or business in order to be eligible for the full rather than the capital
deduction.28
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Generes,29 recently con-
sidered the problem of formulating a criterion for determining busi-
ness, as opposed to nonbusiness, bad debts. The Court adopted a test
requiring that business considerations be the "dominant and primary
motivation" for the debt before full deduction will be allowed in the
event that the debt should become worthless.8 0 The Court reasoned that
23 In several other situations, provision is made for special treatment of activities re-
lated to the taxpayer's trade or business and other activities undertaken for the produc-
tion of income. See, e.g., id. §§ 162, 212 (deductibility of expenses); id. §§ 165(c)(1),(2) (de-
ductibility of losses). Since § 166(d) refers only to trade or business, debts related to
other activities undertaken for profit have been held to be nonbusiness-related debts. See
Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
24 See, e.g., Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1970); Millsap v. Com-
missioner, 387 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1968); Robert E. Gillespie, 54 T.C. 1025 (1970); BA.
Faucher, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 950 (1970).
25 Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F-.d 669 (2d Cir. 1961).
26 See BA. Faucher, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 950 (1970).
27 See Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
28 Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b)(2) (1959).
Mhe character of the debt is to be determined by the relation which the
loss resulting from the debt's becoming worthless bears to the trade or business
of the taxpayer. If that relationship is a proximate one in the conduct of the
trade or business in which the taxpayer is engaged at the time the debt becomes
worthless, the debt comes within the exception [from nonbusiness debts] ....
Id.
29 405 U.S. 93 (1972), rehearing denied, 405 U.S. 1033 (1972).
80 In so doing, the Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the Second and Fifth
Circuits on the one hand and the Seventh Circuit on the other. The Second and Fifth
19721
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since Congress had carefully distinguished between business and non-
business debts, the test to be applied to determine whether a debt is
business related should make the distinction a meaningful one rather
than blunting it. 1' The Court also favored the "dominant motivation"
test since it would prevent the taxpayer from always obtaining favor-
able treatment of the debt 32 and would provide a workable guideline
for the trier of fact.38
Similarities between the stock purchase and bad debt situations
provide a cogent argument for the application of the same test to both. 4
In both, the taxpayer provides funds to a corporation in which he has
Circuits favored a test permitting full deduction for a debt that was "significantly moti-
vated" by business considerations, even if the business considerations provided only a
secondary motivation. United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1970);
Weddle v. Commissioner, 825 F2d 849, 851 (2d Cir. 1963). The Seventh Circuit pro-
pounded the "dominant and primary motivation" test which the Supreme Court ultimately
adopted. Niblock v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 1185, 1187 (7th Cir. 1969).
31 The Code itself carefully distinguishes between business and nonbusiness
items.... [his distinction has been a policy of the income tax structure ever
since the Revenue Act of 1916, § 5(a), 39 Stat. 759, provided differently for trade
or business losses than it did for losses sustained in another transaction entered
into for profit. And it has been the specific policy with respect to bad debts since
the Revenue Act of 1942 incorporated into § 23(k) of the 1989 Code the distinc-
tion between business and nonbusiness bad debts. 56 Stat. 820.
The point, however, is that the tax structures have made the distinction, that
the Congress therefore intended it to be a meaningful one, and that the distinc-
tion is not to be obliterated or blunted by an interpretation that tends to equate
the business bad debt with the nonbusiness bad debt.... We think that emphasis
upon the significant rather than upon the dominant would have a tendency to do
just that.
405 U.S. at 103-04.
32 Id. at 104.
83 Id.
34 The "significant motivation" test, rejected by the Supreme Court in the bad
debt situation (id. at 103-04; see note 30 supra), would likewise be unacceptable in the
stock purchase case. Under this test, the taxpayer could call a gain capital if the stock's
purchase were significantly (though not dominantly) motivated by nonbusiness considera-
tions, or could call a loss ordinary if the purchase were significantly (though not domi-
nantly) motivated by business considerations. Such a result would, under a broad range
of circumstances, allow the taxpayer the option of treating his stock as ordinary or
capital property depending on whether its sale yielded gain or loss, thus violating one
of the criteria previously discussed. See note 16 and accompanying text supra. The realiza-
tion that the taxpayer will always win if the significant motivation test were to be applied
was one of the Supreme Court's major reasons for rejecting it in Generes.
Application of the significant-inotivation standard would also tend to under-
mine and circumscribe the Court's holding in Whipple and the emphasis there
that a shareholder's mere activity in a corporation's affairs is not a trade or busi-
ness. As Chief Judge Lumbard pointed out in his separate and disagreeing con-
currence in Weddle, . . . both motives-that of protecting the investment and
that of protecting the salary--are inevitably involved, and an inquiry whether
employee status provides a significant motivation will always produce an affirma-
tive answer and result in a judgment for the taxpayer.
405 U.S. at 104 (citation omitted).
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both a business and an investment interest. In both, the criterion which
governs the allowance of a loss in full or treatment as a capital loss is
the extent of the business and investment motivations of the taxpayer
in engaging the transaction.85 The results of the two types of trans-
actions are the same: the taxpayer provides capital for the use of the
recipient corporation and thereby increases his financial interest in
that corporation. Therefore, to apply a different test to the transaction
depending on whether it takes the form of a stock purchase or a loan
would be to recognize form over substance, a situation which the
courts have normally tried to avoid in tax litigation.36 In order to pro-
vide similar treatment in these two equivalent situations the "domi-
nant motivation" test-the law in bad debt situations-should also be
applied in stock purchase cases.37
35 Although it is generally true that the motivation at the time of purchase deter-
mines the nature of gain or loss (see Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970)), one noteworthy exception exists. The taxpayer may con-
tinue to hold stock originally purchased as a business necessity after the business reason
for the purchase ceases to exist. In that case, the stock, although eligible for ordinary
treatment had it been sold upon termination of the business need, becomes a capital asset
yielding capital gain or loss. See Missisquoi Corp., 37 T.C. 791, 797 (1962); Gulftex Drug
Co., 29 T.C. 118, 121 (1957). This exception should not bar the use of the dominant
motivation test, however. In such cases the holding of the stock beyond that period for
which it satisfies a business need should be evidence that the dominant purpose for the
purchase was to make an investment. The stock, therefore, should be treated as a capital
asset.
36 See generally Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476 (1940); Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465, 468-70 (1935).
37 There are three differences between the stock purchase and the bad debt situations:
(1) the bad debt deduction is controlled by statute while the ordinary deduction in the
stock purchase situation is a creature of the courts; (2) the stock transaction offers the
possibility of direct gain; and (3) the bad debt provision limits only nonbusiness loans
made by noncorporate taxpayers to capital loss treatment. CODE § 166(d)(1)(B). None
of these differences renders adoption of a uniform standard inappropriate. In both situ-
ations the intent of the law is to require ordinary treatment of gains or losses on busi-
ness-related transactions; the bad debt provision and decisions thereunder provide a
model for the court-made law in the stock transaction situation. In view of holdings
which allow the ordinary loss deduction only when the stock transaction is entirely busi-
ness related, regardless of the corporateness or noncorporateness of the taxpayer (e.g.,
Missisquoi Corp., 37 T.C. 791 (1962); Gulftex Drug Co., 29 T.C. 118 (1957)), the non-
application of the business/nonbusiness distinction to the corporate taxpayer in the
bad debt situation should be seen as a statutory exception to the general rule.
The basic similarity between investment in the form of a loan and investment in
the form of a stock purchase was acknowledged by Mr. Justice Marshall in Generes:
A related congressional purpose in enacting the predecessor to § 166 was "to
put nonbusiness investments in the form of loans on a footing with other non-
business investments." Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 92 (1956). Congress
recognized that there often is only a minor difference, if any, between the in-
vestment in the form of a stock purchase and one in the form of a loan to a
corporation.
405 U.S. at 110 (concurring opinion).
1972]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
The "dominant motivation" standard recently adopted by the
Supreme Court for application in determining the business or non-
business nature of a loan made by a shareholder-employee to his cor-
poration is also the most appropriate standard for determining the
eligibility of stock losses for full deduction under the Corn Products
doctrine. Use of this test will result in the allowance of the full deduc-
tion when the stock purchase is necessary to the taxpayer's business
but will limit the deduction to the appropriate capital loss deduction
in the case of a mere investment which incidentally benefits the tax-
payer's business, thus carrying out the intent of the Supreme Court as
expressed in Corn Products.8s The "dominant motivation" test will
also equalize treatment of stock purchases and loans and prevent mere
differences in transaction form from leading to different methods of
taxation.
Robert A. Warwick
38 Corn Prods. Re.. Co. V. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955).
